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THE APPROPRIATE EXTENT OF
PRE-IMPLANTATION GENETIC
DIAGNOSIS: HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS’ AND SCIENTISTS’
VIEWSONTHE REQUIREMENT FOR
A ‘SIGNIFICANT RISK OF A SERIOUS
GENETIC CONDITION’
ROSAMUND SCOTT, CLARE WILLIAMS,
KATHRYN EHRICH AND BOBBIE FARSIDES
I. INTRODUCTION
If a couple knows or fears that they are at risk of having a child with a
genetic condition or disease, they may seek in vitro fertilisation (IVF)
treatment and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). Although
success cannot be guaranteed, the purpose of PGD is to enable
parents to have a child without a genetic impairment and, in so doing,
to avoid moral or other difficulties in the termination of an already-
begun pregnancy. PGD can be performed when there is a ‘significant
risk of a serious genetic condition being present in the embryo’, the
criteria established by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority (HFEA) and Human Genetics Commission (HGC).1 The
technique involves genetic testing of a cell extracted from a six-to-ten-
cell (day 3) embryo fertilised and grown in vitro. When a couple
approaches a PGD clinic, they may find that the condition of concern
to them is one for which the HFEA has already granted a licence
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(through a licence committee). Or it may be that, as a result of discus-
sions with a couple, the clinic applies for a licence on their behalf for
their condition for the first time. Either way, patients will discuss their
concerns and reasons for seeking treatment with clinicians and other
professionals who provide PGD. Moreover, these health professionals
and scientists will have views about the criteria indicating a ‘significant
risk of a serious genetic condition’ and the operation of these in practice,
particularly the extent to which a given condition can be regarded as
‘serious’.
This paper explores these views by considering the experience and
thoughts of health professionals and scientists working at one UK site
that provides PGD. It also explores these professionals’ views with
reference to the factors that the HFEA and HGC recommend clinics
to consider in deciding whether to offer PGD for a given condition,
such as ‘the view of those seeking treatment of the condition’ and ‘the
likely degree of suffering associated with the condition’. We consider
the views of these health professionals and scientists as revealed in
transcripts both of interviews with individual staff members and of
ethics discussion groups (EDGs). These groups consisted of four to six
members of staff and were facilitated by a philosopher. We also relate
staff’s views and experiences to some key arguments about the appro-
priate scope of PGD and prenatal diagnosis (PND). In particular, we
consider the question of whether, and if so how, prospective parents’
interests should be taken into account in decision-making.
II. THE RECOMMENDATIONS ON RISK AND SERIOUSNESS
Health professionals and scientists involved in PGD (and HFEA licence
committees) operate under the criteria established jointly by the HFEA
and HGC. Following public response to a Consultation Document, the
two issued a report (the ‘Outcome Document’)2 with a number of
recommendations on the provision of PGD, including the key criteria
on risk and seriousness. Those recommendations were subsequently
embodied within the HFEA’s Sixth Code of Practice.3 The criteria for
PGD, the views of those who sit on the HFEA’s licence committees
and of health professionals and scientists who provide PGD, will each
have a bearing on the extent to which a couple can choose to try and
avoid the birth of a child with a certain condition and so upon the
extent of their reproductive autonomy. The appropriate scope of such
autonomy is controversial, particularly in this context when we are
2 Supra n. 1.
3 HFEA, Code of Practice, 6th Edn., (2003).
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considering to what extent a couple should be able to try to avoid the
birth of a particular child, for instance because of a certain genetic
condition, in favour of another child without that condition.
Before we turn to explore the way health professionals and scientists
perceive and experience the criteria governing PGD and the factors to
take into account in deciding whether to offer any given test, it is
worth considering how the HFEA and HGC decided on these criteria
and how they envisaged they would operate, especially the way in
which access to treatment would be discussed and negotiated. For
instance, how did the HFEA and HGC foresee the relationship
between health professionals and prospective parents?
Prior to the consultation exercise, PGD had been licensed in line with
the criteria of the disability ground of the Abortion Act 1967 (as
amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990).
That ground requires that two clinicians consider that there is a ‘sub-
stantial risk’ of a child being born ‘seriously handicapped’.4 Following
the consultation, the HFEA and HGC decided to continue the ‘pre-
cautionary principle’ of broadly aligning the criteria for PGD with
those for selective abortion.5 Recommendation 11 contains the chosen
criteria for PGD: ‘The guidance should indicate that PGD should only
be available where there is a significant risk of a serious genetic
condition being present in the embryo’.
We can immediately see that there are differences between the
wording in the Abortion Act and that in Recommendation 11. Most
obviously, perhaps, the level of risk is not the same. For abortion, this
must be ‘substantial’; for PGD, it must be ‘significant’. The first term
implies a certain quantitative level of risk; it is not clear what the
second implies. It could refer to a quantitative element, including a
degree of risk that is less than substantial, but still of some weight. In
this sense, the concern would be the statistical risk of the condition
(depending on whether it is dominant, recessive, random but high, or
sporadic but low). Or the term ‘significant risk’ could imply a degree
of risk with a certain meaning to the couple seeking treatment: i.e. the
perception, or experience, of the couple of the impact of the disorder.
Or the term could be intended to mean both of these. Indeed, if
we explore more deeply the recommendations governing PGD, we see
4 The relevant part of s.1(1)(1) of the Act reads: ‘Subject to the provisions of this section,
a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a preg-
nancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered medical prac-
titioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith. . . (d) that there is a substantial risk
that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities
as to be seriously handicapped’.
5 Supra n. 1. The reference to the ‘precautionary principle’ is in para. 25.
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that while the HFEA and HGC profess broadly to align the criteria for
PGD with those for selective abortion, the discussions and recommen-
dations within the Outcome Document explicitly mention and give
weight to the views of prospective parents on the two criteria. This is
in contrast to the relevant section of the Abortion Act, which makes
no mention of the views of prospective parents and explicitly requires
that the two clinicians are of the view, formed in good faith, that the
criteria of ‘substantial risk’ and ‘serious handicap’ are satisfied.
For instance, one section of the Outcome Document on PGD notes
that the Joint Working Party (JWP) of the HFEA and HGC agreed
that ‘the nature of the decision to pursue treatment involving PGD. . .
meant that a central role in the judgement about the significance of
the risk and the seriousness of the condition should be given to the
people seeking treatment’.6 Another stresses the ‘crucial importance of
the views and experiences of those seeking treatment in decision-
making’.7 Here the personal nature of the issues in question is appar-
ently being emphasised. This may begin to explain the difference in
the nature of the risk specified in the Abortion Act on the one hand
and the criteria for PGD on the other, although it is not clear that the
degree of risk (or views on the seriousness of a condition) in the abortion
arena is any less personal. The appropriate degree of risk in PGD com-
pared with PND was discussed by the JWP8:
Some members pointed out that the risk should be substantial, and
that people seeking treatment should not be allowed to pursue
treatment where there was only a minimal risk (as they would
not in PND), although it was acknowledged that this could poten-
tially invite a conflict between people seeking treatment involving
a particular test and clinicians who do not consider that the risk
warrants it.
The passage seems to show two concerns: first, that parents might want
to test too freely; second, that to require a substantial degree of risk
could be problematic in relations between those seeking treatment and
clinicians. So what is a ‘significant’ risk?
The JWP recommended that ‘the significance of the risk to people
seeking treatment, not the level of risk itself, should be judged by
6 Supra n. 1, para. 32 and Rec. 13, our emphases. Para. 34 addresses the issue of infor-
mation provision, especially the need for balanced information that includes ‘that pro-
vided by disabled people and their families’, an issue to which we return later.
7 Ibid. para. 21. This paragraph is concerned with the relevance of RGOG guidance on
termination of pregnancy, to which we return in due course.
8 HFEA/HGC, Minutes of Joint Working Party on Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis,
30 March 2001, para. 5.4.
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agreement between the people seeking treatment and the clinical team’.9
This passage seems to acknowledge that the way a couple perceives a
risk is not governed solely by how great that risk is in percentage
terms. The passage also suggests that the couple and the clinical team
should discuss and agree upon the significance of the risk. There is a
further recommendation of relevance here, as Recommendation 13
states: ‘The guidance should indicate that the perception of the level
of risk by the people seeking treatment is an important factor in the
decision-making process’. If we look at minutes of a JWP meeting on
this point, we find ‘that what [is] intended [is] the subjective evaluation
of the level of risk in the minds of the people seeking treatment’.10 Ulti-
mately then, prospective parents’ perception of the risk is described as
‘an important factor’; at the same time, ‘agreement’ is required as to
the significance of the risk. In this way, the term ‘significant risk’ in Rec-
ommendation 11 should perhaps be understood as one that acknowl-
edges the weight of prospective parents’ views, but also requires that
they discuss their views with clinicians, who may or may not agree
that a risk is indeed ‘significant’. The implication is that if they do
not, the criteria for PGD are not satisfied. In fact, it is highly unlikely
that any of the health professionals or scientists at a clinic will be or
has been in the same position as those seeking treatment. So there
may sometimes be difficulties in agreeing upon the significance of the
risk.
When the HFEA and HGC turned to consider the criterion of serious-
ness, there was a concern, which seems to reflect that in relation to the
degree of risk, ‘that the decision should not be made solely by the
parents as some had very wide definitions of what counts as serious,
which many others would not agree with’.11 The final recommendation
implicitly recognises that prospective parents will have views on this
matter, but also requires that those views are discussed with clinicians:
Recommendation 14 states that ‘the seriousness of a condition should be
a matter for discussion between the people seeking treatment and the
clinical team’.12 We do not find quite the same attention here (as we
9 Ibid. para. 5.11.
10 HFEA/HGC, Minutes of Joint Working Party on Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis,
11 May 2001, para. 5.15, our emphasis.
11 HGC, Minutes of Genetic Testing Sub-group, 12 Jan. 2001, para. 5.4, per Dr Flinter,
our emphases.
12 Supra n. 1. The recommendation goes on to state that ‘information provided to those
seeking treatment . . . should include genetic and clinical information about the specific
condition; its likely impact on those affected and their families; information about treat-
ment and social support available; and the testimony of families and individuals about
the full range of experiences of living with the condition’. Curiously, a somewhat puz-
zling variation of the point in Rec. 14 can be found in the Summary of the Responses to
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did in relation to the degree of risk) to the views of parents and there is
no overt suggestion that seriousness is a subjective matter. Yet, since the
recommendation explicitly requires that seriousness should be a matter
of discussion, there appears to be a realisation that there may be a range
of views on the matter. This is in contrast to the disability ground of the
Abortion Act, which makes no reference to the views of prospective
parents or to discussions between them and health professionals. (It
should be remembered here that abortion itself is a crime, to which
the opinion of two doctors that one of the grounds for abortion is
made out provides a defence.13) It may well be that increasing awareness
of the difficulty of defining ‘serious’ underlies this recommendation:
notably, the HGC observed: ‘It has proved impossible to define what
“serious” should mean in this context’.14
On the whole, the HFEA and HGC seem to have tried both to recog-
nise, to some extent at least, the personal nature of the issues at stake in
PGD, but also to observe limits to the acceptability of the views of pro-
spective parents and so, ultimately, to reproductive autonomy. This is
clearly expressed in the statement that
[t]he JWP agreed the importance of placing greater emphasis on the
role of those seeking treatment in reaching the decision about when
treatment was appropriate, whilst at the same time maintaining
that this should not imply that this treatment should be available
on demand.15
The idea, it seems, is that this delicate balance will be achieved by means
of the stated criteria (‘significant risk of a serious genetic condition’) as
discussed, interpreted and agreed between prospective parents and
health professionals on the one hand and clinics and licence committees
on the other.
What is it like for PGD health professionals and scientists to operate
under these criteria? How do they feel about trying to achieve the
balance between respect for personal views on the one hand and the
acceptable limits to reproductive autonomy on the other that seems to
be sought by the HFEA and HGC? How do health professionals and
scientists perceive the risks and the seriousness of the genetic conditions
the Consultation Document, which at one point observes that ‘80% agreed that the ser-
iousness of a genetic condition should be a matter of clinical judgment based on general
guidance’. HFEA/HGC, Analysis of the Responses to the Joint HFEA/AGCT Consul-
tation on PGD, para. 56(iv).
13 Offences against the Person Act, 1861, ss. 58, 59.
14 HGC, Response to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority on the Consul-
tation on Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, para. 6.
15 Supra n. 1, para. 23.
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in question? What do they think about prospective parents’ views about
these matters? Do they see themselves as being some kind of a ‘check’ on
the potentially excessively wide views of prospective parents?
III. HEALTH PROFESSIONALS’ AND SCIENTISTS’
EXPERIENCE AND VIEWS
This central section of our paper considers health professionals’ and
scientists’ experience and views of the twin criteria of ‘significant risk’
and ‘serious genetic condition’. In due course, the discussion is devel-
oped with explicit reference to the factors that the HFEA and HGC
recommended should be considered in the decision to offer PGD, such
as ‘the view of those seeking treatment of the condition’ and ‘the
likely degree of suffering associated with the condition’. In effect,
these factors help elucidate the meaning of the criteria for PGD.
A. ‘Significant Risk’
The question of the degree of risk facing a couple was touched on in
several of the EDGs. Some members of staff appear to see the issue of
risk in quantitative terms. For instance, Scientist 19 refers to the idea
of a ‘significantly increased risk above population risk’.16 This same
scientist also states that there is no need for additional tests that will
compromise accuracy, when people are not ‘at risk’.17 Another
member of staff (Nurse 13) comments that if the risk is greater, this
helps you to ‘feel easier maybe about what you’re doing’.18 The relation-
ship between the criteria is also touched on in discussions. For instance,
Scientist 2 comments that although there may only be a risk rather than
a certainty of a condition occurring in a child, the risk could relate to a
very serious condition.19
Some of the health professionals and scientists also work in the area
of prenatal screening, diagnosis and termination, and the recognition
that risk may have a subjective component is clearly revealed in the
account of a woman whowas already pregnant and undergoing prenatal
screening. The account is given by Counsellor 28.20 The woman in ques-
tion had previously given birth to a child with a ‘very nasty disease’ who
16 Ethics Discussion Group (EDG) 1, Scientist 19, 6.
17 EDG 1, Scientist 19, 11.
18 EDG 3, Nurse 13, 8. For a detailed discussion of the staff’s attitudes to embryos, see also
K. Ehrich, C. Williams, B. Farsides, J. Sandall and R. Scott, ‘Choosing Embryos: Ethical
Complexity in Staff accounts of Preimimplantation Genetic Diagnosis’, (2007) Soci-
ology of Health and Illness ( forthcoming).
19 EDG 5, Scientist 2, 19.
20 EDG 2, Counsellor 28, 13–14.
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‘died very horribly’. She now had a new partner, so that her risk of
having another affected child was ‘really very small’. ‘But. . . she was
at the stage of her life that she was so anxious about what might
happen and the pregnancy brought back all the kinds of memories
and feelings that losing her baby obviously reminded her of’. A test
for the condition that affected her child was negative, but a scan revealed
a relatively mild and unconnected physical malformation that could be
corrected once the child had been born.
And that was the only abnormality with this baby, but the girl
became so convinced that this was like a sign, a premonition, you
know, a sort of marker, that this was all going to go wrong
again. And as a result of that, she became. . . very mentally unstable.
And we really felt that if she had been forced to continue with that
pregnancy, she may have ended her life.
This case highlights the potentially subjective nature of risk. Clearly, it
also raises questions about seriousness. Counsellor 28 notes that the
relatively minor physical malformation would not have satisfied the
requirement of seriousness under the disability ground of the Abortion
Act. However, in light of the woman’s fears about something else being
wrong with the foetus, the health professionals were in fact concerned
about a risk to her mental health. Although the account does not
record on what grounds an abortion was sanctioned, it is likely that
this would have been under section 1(1)(a). This permits abortion
where ‘the pregnancy has not exceeded twenty-four weeks and. . . the
continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the
pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health
of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family’. A set
of Royal College of Obstetrician and Gynaecologists’ guidance
implicitly notes the potential use of this ground for foetal disability in
the following terms21:
Women vary in their reaction to being told that their fetus is, or
may be, abnormal. Occasionally a woman feels strongly that she
is unable to accept a probability of risk or a degree of handicap
that her medical practitioners consider less than substantial or
21 RCOG, Termination of Pregnancy for Fetal Abnormality in England, Wales and Scot-
land (RCOG Press, Jan. 1996) at para. 3.4. The guidance continues: ‘After 24 weeks the
grounds for abortion for mental health are more stringent; the continuation of the preg-
nancy must result in grave permanent damage to mental health. Such damage to mental
health is unlikely to result from a woman’s concern about a fetal abnormality that her
doctors do not consider serious enough to satisfy the law. In effect this means that after
24 weeks the abortion decision must be based only on the anticipated risk that the child
would be seriously handicapped’.
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serious. Under such circumstances, and only when the gestation is
less than 24 weeks, the practitioners may decide that abortion has
become necessary to protect her mental health.
In such circumstances, a woman’s views about the degree of risk or the
seriousness of the disability are in effect being taken into account by use
of another ground of the Abortion Act. As noted previously, the actual
disability ground of the Act makes no mention of a woman’s (or her
partner’s) views about disability. Curiously, perhaps, the Outcome
Document on PGD makes no reference to the use of section 1(1)(a) of
the Abortion Act in the context of disability.
It is interesting to speculate what would have happened if, instead of
becoming pregnant with her new partner, the woman had instead
sought PGD, for instance, for the condition which had affected her
first child. As noted above, her risk (with her new partner) of having
another child with the same condition was now ‘very small’. Under-
standably, however, she was very fearful of something going wrong
with a subsequent pregnancy. To what extent could these fears have
been relevant to a decision to provide PGD of some kind? Two of the
factors that the HFEA and HGC recommend should be considered
when deciding the appropriateness of PGD (discussed further below)
could have been particularly relevant: the view of those seeking treat-
ment of the condition and their previous reproductive experience.
However, although the woman may have been very fearful, where the
risk is in fact ‘very small’, it is not clear that her subjective experience
can gain her access to PGD. Indeed, as we saw above, while the
HFEA and HGC intended the term ‘significant risk’ to mean ‘the subjec-
tive evaluation of the level of risk in the minds of the people seeking
treatment’ and this is ‘an important factor’, agreement is still required
as to the significance of the risk. It seems unlikely that health pro-
fessionals and scientists would have agreed that the risk was ‘signifi-
cant’. Undoubtedly, resource considerations will also be relevant here
in the NHS context. Further, since the woman in this revised scenario
is not already pregnant, there would not be the immediate concern
with her mental health—and the need, in some sense, to ‘rescue’
her—that there was in the original case.
B. ‘Serious Genetic Condition’
We have discussed a case from the context of prenatal screening and
selective abortion that highlighted the potentially subjective nature of
risk and speculated on the degree to which this can be relevant in the
context of PGD. The case also raised issues about seriousness, a ques-
tion about which health professionals and scientists had a great deal
to say in the interviews and discussion groups. By way of introduction
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to this issue, it may be useful to note that recollection of the case above
led Counsellor 28 to observe22:
I’ve always thought, perhaps it’s one of the reasons it hasn’t been
done in law, is that you can’t kind of. . . write a list of things or con-
ditions that you consider serious. . . . And I think one of the reasons
it’s not been done in law is that it – the perception and the reality of
seriousness isn’t just about the condition itself.
Having recounted the above case, Counsellor 28 continued: ‘[I]f you did
have a list, I think you would be less of a clinician, because the notion of
clinical judgement and care of your patient or family would have to go
out the window’.23 The suggestion here seems to be that the perceptions
of the prospective parents and the situation of the wider family may be
relevant to an assessment of seriousness. As we shall see, this suggestion
is given further weight by the views of other staff.
Before turning to their views, we might note—not surprisingly in light
of Counsellor 28’s comments about the difficulties of drawing up a list—
that the HFEA and HGC rejected the idea of a ‘prescriptive list of
“serious conditions” for which PGD was thought to be appropriate’.24
(Parliament likewise rejected the idea of such a list in relation to
abortion for foetal disability on the basis that this would interfere
with clinical discretion. This is particularly important because con-
ditions may vary in their severity.25) Instead of producing a list of
serious conditions, ‘[i]n line with responses to the consultation. . . the
JWP considered that it would be appropriate to specify factors that
should be taken into account in reaching a decision to provide PGD
treatment’.26 This list is contained in Recommendation 1527:
The guidance should indicate that in any particular situation the
following factors should be considered when deciding the appropri-
ateness of PGD: the view of those seeking treatment of the con-
dition; their previous reproductive experience; the likely degree of
suffering associated with the condition; the availability of effective
therapy or management now and in the future; the speed of
degeneration in progressive disorders; the extent of any intellectual
22 EDG 2, Counsellor 28, 13.
23 Ibid. 14.
24 Supra n. 1, para. 23.
25 On the approval of medical discretion generally in the application of the Act, see
Hansard, 21 June 1990, vol. 174, col. 1156, per Mrs Maria Fyfe: ‘If the law sets par-
ameters that do not allowmedical judgments to be freely exercised, it must be defective’.
26 Supra n. 1, para. 37.
27 Ibid., our emphasis. See also HFEA, supra n. 3, para. 14.23.
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impairment; the extent of social support available; and the family
circumstances of the people seeking treatment.
All of these factors could be helpful in our exploration of health pro-
fessionals’ and scientists’ views on seriousness, some particularly so.
We do not have the scope here to give them equal weight in our dis-
cussion, and we do not necessarily look at them in the order listed
above.
At the outset, it is worth noting how decisions about seriousness are
made in this clinic. Given that different professionals will hold a range
of views about the seriousness of conditions and the appropriateness of
testing for them, the clinic discusses decisions on a case-by-case basis.
Where it wishes to start testing for a new condition, the clinic holds mul-
tidisciplinary meetings approximately every six weeks prior to applying
for a licence from the HFEA. Present at these are reproductive clinicians,
geneticists, molecular biologists, counsellors, clinical geneticists, embry-
ologists, cytogeneticists, specialist clinicians in haematology and derma-
tology and administrators involved in planning cases.
1. The View of Those Seeking Treatment of the Condition
This factor explicitly refers to the need to take into account prospective
parents’ views. As we have seen, the HGC has stated that it is ‘imposs-
ible’ to define seriousness. What we might call the ‘subjectivity’ of
seriousness was a much-discussed issue in the groups. For instance,
Doctor 24 says ‘[w]hat I feel is serious, minor, is a very subjective
issue especially to parents’.28 He/she expands:29
Maybe for a parent having a child with six fingers, is minor. That’s
the only thing I can think of myself. Anything beyond that, any
handicap in a child, I would not consider not serious. So, we
have to – it’s a very personal opinion as to – I mean I can’t off
hand think of any condition which should not be tested because
it’s not serious.
Similarly, Counsellor 18 says of the notion of seriousness that ‘[w]e all
have a different idea of what it is’.30 In light of the developments in PGD
technology (‘it is just going to develop and progress over the centuries’)
Counsellor 18 continues31:
[T]here will always be people pushing the boundaries, and it’s a
serious condition this week, but like we’ve said, nobody can
28 EDG 1, Doctor 24, 7.
29 Our emphasis.
30 EDG 3, Counsellor 18, 15.
31 EDG 3, Counsellor 18, 23.
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really define seriousness. . . and what is serious for you won’t be for
me. And I think it’s this, and you think it’s that. And in ten years’
time, they’ll think. . .
Differences of view about seriousness are also noted by Embryologist
3332: ‘I think how one person copes with it and how another person
copes with ‘serious’ is going to be different as well. . . What one
person thinks is a serious condition, the next person might not’.
Importantly, however, within the groups there was also a sense that
although there is a subjective element to seriousness, at the same time
there must be a limit to what could in any sense be regarded as a
‘serious genetic condition’: it cannot be that ‘anything goes’. For
instance, in response to the last comment above, Scientist 2 observes33:
‘No, but, when it’s serious, their life is completely debilitated by it. . . it’s
medically serious’. Later, he/she adds: ‘If we said the possibility is it’s
going to be mild, we wouldn’t do PGD for it. But if the possibility is
there that it’s going to be fairly serious, that’s why it’s done’. Further,
as we saw above, Doctor 24 suggested that having an extra finger
could not in any sense be ‘serious’, thus seeming to place extra digits
at the non-serious end of the spectrum of ‘abnormality’. As for other
conditions which may not be serious, Nurse 13 suggests that a condition
such as cleft palate is not serious, although ‘people are clamouring for’
the relevant testing.34 Not surprisingly, these observations show that
health professionals and scientists have views—although not necessarily
homogeneous ones—about which conditions will satisfy the criterion of
‘a serious genetic condition’. In any case, as we know, the HFEA and
HGC require (in Recommendation 14) ‘that the seriousness of a con-
dition should be a matter for discussion between the people seeking
treatment and the clinical team’.
So far, we have seen that although these health professionals and
scientists consider that ‘serious’ has a subjective component, at the
same time several members of staff think it is not a ‘free-for-all’. It
may now be helpful to think more closely about the possible meanings
of ‘serious’ by considering whose interests may be at stake in PGD. In
this regard, a very important question was posed by Doctor 11: ‘Is
seriousness. . . [about] the person that’s going to be affected by that con-
dition? Is it serious at their level, not so much our level?’35
This question has been considered in the related context of PND and
selective abortion. Notably, Sally Sheldon and Stephen Wilkinson have
32 EDG 5, Embryologist 33, 19.
33 EDG 5, Scientist 2, 19.
34 EDG 3, Nurse 13, 24.
35 EDG 4, Doctor 11, 27.
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helpfully clarified this issue in relation to the interpretation of the dis-
ability ground of the Abortion Act. Sheldon and Wilkinson argue that
when the foetus would be born as a child with what many would
regard as an extremely serious condition (perhaps Tay–Sachs),36
termination may well be in the foetus’s interests, a position in accord-
ance with other philosophical analyses.37 Since it may be that if born
such a child would say her life was not worth living (see further
below), it may also be that, if not terminated in utero, the subsequently
born child could claim, ethically speaking, to have a wrongful life.38
Yet, there are remarkably few conditions that might be potentially
serious in this way. Recognition of this requires that we think of other
possible justifications for PND and termination and indeed for PGD.
Where a child would be born with a condition that would mean she
still thought she had a life worth living, a more satisfactory rationale for
use of the disability ground of the Abortion Act might be found in the
notion of ‘parental interests’, as Sheldon and Wilkinson have
argued.39 This type of argument could also be applied in the context
36 ‘The classical form of Tay–Sachs disease (TSD) is a fatal genetic disorder in children
that causes progressive destruction of the central nervous system. . . By about two
years of age, most children experience recurrent seizures and diminishing mental func-
tion. The infant gradually regresses, losing skills one by one, and is eventually unable to
crawl, turn over, sit, or reach out. Other symptoms include increasing loss of coordi-
nation, progressive inability to swallow and breathing difficulties. Eventually, the
child becomes blind, mentally retarded, paralyzed, and non-responsive to his or her
environment. To date, there is no cure or effective treatment for TSD’. National
Tay–Sachs and Allied Diseases Association, Inc. http://www.ntsad.org/pages/t-
sachs.html.
37 S. Sheldon and S. Wilkinson, ‘Termination of Pregnancy for Reason of Foetal Disability:
Are there Grounds for a Special Exception in Law?’, (2001) 9 Med. L. Rev. 85, 88ff. A
second rationale for the disability ground of the Abortion Act discussed and ultimately
rejected by Sheldon and Wilkinson is the so-called “replacement argument”. Ibid. 93ff.
For a compatible analysis, see, e.g. A. Buchanan, D. Brock, N. Daniels and D. Wikler,
From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2000) at
235.
38 See e.g. A. Buchanan et al., supra n. 37, ibid. As Sheldon and Wilkinson note, however,
such a claim has not been recognised in English law. Sheldon and Wilkinson, supra
n. 37, 89, and referring to McKay v. Essex A.H.A. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 890.
39 S. Sheldon and S. Wilkinson, supra n. 37, 99ff. The legal objection to this argument,
originally explored by Derek Morgan (D. Morgan, ‘Abortion: the Unexamined
Ground’ [1990] Crim. L.R. 687, 692) is that a ‘parental interests’ interpretation of
s.1(1)(d) of the Act would essentially repeat s.1(1)(a) of the Act, making s.1(1)(d) redun-
dant. Sheldon and Wilkinson observe that, from an ethical viewpoint, it may simply be
that there is more than one justification for this section. From the viewpoint of statutory
interpretation, however, they suggest that ‘there are some grounds for questioning’
whether Parliament can have intended that s.1(1)(d) should protect parents’ interests.
S.1(1)(d) can never be entirely redundant in that, unlike s.1(1)(a), it allows terminations
up until birth. Apart from this point and more fundamentally, it may be that as a society
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of PGD, the rationale for which is of course our main consideration
here. The thought is that PND or PGD for conditions that are not as
serious as ( for instance) Tay–Sachs, coupled with the option of termin-
ation or embryo discard, may potentially respond to parents’ concerns
and interests.
At the first mention of this kind of possible parental interest, it should
immediately be noted that, although this paper discusses staff’s views
about parents’ concerns and relates these to ethical arguments about
whether it can be appropriate to take account of parents’ possible inter-
ests in the evaluation of ‘seriousness’, nothing of what follows should be
taken as implying that raising a child with a disability is necessarily
more demanding than raising a non-disabled child. Further, we make
no judgment as to the balance of rewards and demands in raising a dis-
abled, as compared with a non-disabled child. This is a judgment for
parents to make. Experiences will vary widely and some or many
people may say that raising a disabled child is particularly rewarding.
Before leaving the PND context, if parents are to have the legal option
of termination in any given case, two clinicians must judge in good faith
that the condition is ‘serious’. (It is likely that parents would only have
been offered screening or testing aimed at ‘serious’ conditions of some
kind, although a less serious feature might happen to be found on a
scan.) In effect, then, where a foetus would be born as a child with a
life she thought worth living, but clinicians still judge a given condition
to amount to a ‘serious handicap’ for the purposes of the disability
section of the Abortion Act, they are effectively determining that
although the condition would leave a child with a life worth living, it
has an element of seriousness which implicates its parents’ interests in
child-raising and, moreover, to an extent that justifies termination.
Since there is a dearth of case-law on the Abortion Act, there is as yet
no overt recognition of this point, although the law has recognised
that parents can sue for the lost opportunity to abort a disabled child
and that to some extent this is because of their interests in child-
raising.40
Returning directly to PGD, here too we face the point that very few
genetic conditions might be so serious as to give rise to a life that a
child thought was not worth living. (We consider health professionals’
we have not necessarily been honest about whose interests the disability section of the
Act is capable of protecting: it is to some degree taboo to say that parents have an inter-
est in choosing to accept or avoid the birth of an impaired child and those debating the
Act in Parliament may well have sensed this.
40 For discussion of relevant wrongful birth case law (and interpretation of the disability
ground of the Abortion Act generally), see R. Scott, ‘Interpreting the Disability
Ground of the Abortion Act’, (2005) 64/1 C.L.J. 388.
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and scientists’ thoughts about some specific contenders for the descrip-
tion ‘very serious’ below.) This means that it may be appropriate
to recognise that at least some forms of PGD are conducted for the
prospective parents. Scientist 21 makes this point very clearly41:
I was at a conference. . . Parent Project UK, which is a charity which
is aimed at . . . therapy for Duchenne muscular dystrophy people,
and they were all parents. So one presented a talk actually which
I found very interesting, and they looked at the quality of life for
families with boys with Duchenne muscular dystrophy, which is
a severe disease. The average lifespan now is about 19. And the
quality of life of – the perception of the quality of life of the
affected boy was rated differently by parents, by the clinicians
looking after them and by the boys themselves. And the boys
themselves. . . gave their rating of quality of life the same as any
healthy controlled sample. And the parents gave them the lowest
quality and the clinicians gave them somewhere in between the
two, which was interesting, I thought. . . . So that implies we’re
doing this for the parents and not for the child in some respects.
Earlier, Scientist 21 observed42: ‘Obviously people want to have chil-
dren and when they have children with disability or handicap, to
some extent that makes their life a bit more miserable compared to
what they’re hoping for’. The potential impact of a child’s disability
on parents was observed by a number of participants. Scientist 8
refers to the ‘huge burden’ that parents may experience.43 He/she also
alludes to the idea of undoubtedly serious conditions on the one hand
and conditions about which parents may disagree on the other44:
I mean I think there are conditions which are under all circum-
stances, horrendous. And can be put very firmly on that list. But I
completely agree with [participant], I mean I think there are lots
of conditions which aren’t clear-cut and which for some families
might be considered serious and others not.
Further, Administrator 31 observes: ‘I think you need to look at
people’s – you know seriousness, to a certain extent, has to be based
on people’s perception of their ability to cope’. Ethically speaking, we
could relate the idea of the ‘ability to cope’ to the question of the extensive
positive moral duties that parents must undertake in child-raising and to
the idea that people might reasonably disagree about how much is
41 EDG 2, Scientist 21, 3–4, our emphases.
42 EDG 2, Scientist 21, 2.
43 EDG 2, Scientist 8, 5.
44 Ibid. 14.
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reasonable to have to ‘take on’ (assuming there is a choice at the stage of
selection by PGD or PND). So, each of these members of staff seems to
recognise and accept that parents’ interests are significantly implicated
in the possible wish to avoid a child with a serious genetic condition.
Turning now to the interaction between health professionals and
prospective parents, in which they may (explicitly or otherwise)
discuss the notion of seriousness, it appears that meeting the couple
and learning something about their experience can considerably affect
the views of staff. For instance, Doctor 11 observes45: ‘[K]nowing the
couple can have an amazing effect on how you feel about them’. Coun-
sellor 17 adds46: “I guess if you do get the opportunity to see, hear a
little bit more about the whole story behind. . . the couple, you’ve
got more of an idea of the issues then, for them too’. The philosopher
facilitating the discussion suggested to one of the groups47: ‘So you
think if someone has personally experienced something, they’re in a pos-
ition to tell you, in a real sense, how serious it is to them, in a way that
might not seem obvious from the outside?’, to which Doctor 11
responds ‘[t]hat’s where it sits with me’. This perspective is echoed by
Embryologist 1548: ‘[I]n general, if I was pushed about it, I would
probably still lean towards the side of the parents for opting to go
through it because they obviously have either seen their child go
through that or someone in their family’.
Generally, there did not seem to be any strong disagreement with the
idea, expressed by Scientist 2, that ‘you have to be able to see patients’
perspectives’.49 Referring to the way the clinic works as a team, he/she
continues ‘and then [you] open it to everyone who works in the unit,
and then their perspectives as well’. On the one hand, then, there are dis-
cussions between people seeking treatment and one or more members of
staff; on the other, the staff will then discuss a given request for PGD
among themselves (as noted earlier). Since the staff are actively involved
in all the processes in PGD, they need to feel as comfortable as they can
with the acceptability of PGD for a given condition. The ethical dimen-
sions of staff involvement in PGD was a much-discussed issue in the
groups, but not one on which we can focus here.50
In this section we have reviewed these health professionals’ and scien-
tists’ thoughts about the ‘subjective’ notion of seriousness, but at the
45 EDG 4, Doctor 11, 24.
46 EDG 4, Counsellor 17, 24.
47 B. Farsides, EDG 4, 28.
48 Interview, Embryologist 15, 2.
49 EDG 5, Scientist 2, 27.
50 E.g. in EDG 1, 2 and 5. The issue was also referred to by various members of staff in
interview, e.g. Scientist 2, Doctor 6 and Embryologist 15.
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same time noted that they do not necessarily think that any condition
can reasonably be seen as serious. We have also noted, in response to
Doctor 11’s question (‘Is it serious at their level, not so much our
level?’), that in reflecting on seriousness, it is important to think about
‘serious for whom?’. As others have recognised, there is a distinction
between conditions that are so serious that it may, conceivably, not be
in the embryo’s or foetus’s interests to be born on the one hand and con-
ditions that are less serious and that may have a significant impact on a
child’s life but, more particularly, on its parents on the other.51We then
considered the recognition, by staff, of the importance of the views of
prospective parents about the seriousness of a condition.
It should be noted in passing that an alternative way of reflecting on
selection practices would be to adopt a non-person-affecting perspec-
tive. On this approach, we would be thinking of the lives of different
possible people and recognising that, other things being equal, it may
be preferable if people are born who at least start life without impair-
ments or disorders that may impede their capacity for flourishing and
welfare. Not surprisingly perhaps, no distinction is made between a
person- and a non-person-affecting approach in the 1990 Act, nor in
the HFEA’s Sixth Code of Practice. More particularly, we shall not
discuss non-person-affecting principles here, because these were not
identified as relevant by the professionals at the clinic (with one possible
exception).
We now need to look at something of the spectrum of possible con-
ditions in order to further disentangle the embryo’s or foetus’s interests
from those of its parents or the wider family, where these may diverge.
We do this with reference to another factor that the HFEA and HGC
recommend should be considered in relation to the decision to offer
PGD, namely ‘the likely degree of suffering associated with the
condition’.
2. The Likely Degree of Suffering Associated with the Condition
2.1 Very serious conditions
Clearly, suffering could be of a mental or physical form. Either way, it
may impact on someone’s quality of life. The difficulty with this import-
ant factor is that we have to estimate the degree of suffering in
conditions we have not experienced. Arguably, anyone with a given con-
dition will be the best informed about it and, in the PGD context,
51 The reference to interests is used loosely, since it may be argued that the embryo has
none until it acquires them at sentience. On the link between interests and sentience,
see B. Steinbock, Life Before Birth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 24,
n. 24. On the notion of interests, see J. Feinberg, Harm to Others (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1984) at 34: ‘In general, a person has a stake in X. . . when
he stands to gain or lose depending on the nature or condition of X’.
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sometimes prospective parents will themselves be in a position to offer
insights. We start with some of the conditions staff mentioned that are
often regarded as undoubtedly serious. Recall, for instance, Scientist
2’s reference to a life being ‘completely debilitated’ by a ‘medically
serious condition’.
‘I think I would consider a serious condition, for instance, a genetic
condition called Tay–Sachs disease, where the children die in child-
hood. . . I would consider that a serious condition because a child
being so sick in early life, and going through all the things. . .’, observes
Doctor 32.52 Tay–Sachs is often cited as a classic case of a very serious
condition. Since a child with Tay–Sachs lives such a short time and in a
state of rapid and marked physical and mental deterioration, it may not
be feasible to obtain the views of such a child on his or her suffering.
Looking from the outside, however, it may be plausible to say that
the suffering would be very great.
It might be useful at this point to think about the significance of the
potential losses—of experiences, activities or opportunities—involved
indisease or disability. In this respect a key ideamaybe that of flourishing.
Glover writes about disability in this way. He suggests that disability is a
‘functional limitation, which (either on its own or – more usually – in
combination with social disadvantage) impairs the capacity for human
flourishing’.53 When we have not experienced a given condition, he
asks whether, and if so how, we can make the judgment that it
amounts to a disability. Glover suggests that strong weight should be
given to the accounts and views of those with disabilities. This implies
that we should take the views, noted earlier, of the boys with Duchenne
muscular dystrophy very seriously. However, because people’s identities
are to some degree inherent in their disabilities, Glover suggests that these
views ‘need to be interpreted with alertness to possible biases’.54He also
notes that, in reflecting onwhethera condition amounts to a disability,we
have other sources upon which we can draw: on the one, ideas about the
components of human flourishing; on the other, the knowledge that
people who can see and hear, for instance, can give about these senses
and their experience of them.55
In this light, and returning to the example of Duchenne muscular
dystrophy, it may be that although these boys rated their quality of
life as high as that of healthy boys, it could be argued that the condition
brings with it the possibility of suffering and loss of the opportunity to
52 EDG 3, Doctor 32, 18.
53 J. Glover, Choosing Children: Genes, Disability and Design (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006) at 9.
54 Ibid. 22.
55 Ibid. 22–23.
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flourish. In this way, Duchenne muscular dystrophy may reasonably be
viewed, as Scientist 21 suggests, as a ‘severe’ disease and perhaps a ‘very
severe’ one. However, since judgments by third parties about the quality
of life of possible others are obviously difficult and sensitive, as Glover
has suggested, rather than attempting to make clear-cut judgments
about conditions that we have not experienced, it may be better to
restrict ourselves to the question of whether there is a serious risk that
a child would have a life that was not worth living.56 Glover thinks
this might be true of a condition such as Lesch–Nyhan disease.57 It
also seems likely that we can say there is such a risk in the case of
Tay–Sachs. At the same time, it is not clear whether we can say this
in relation to Duchenne muscular dystrophy. With regard to the boys
who have Duchenne muscular dystrophy, Scientist 8 observed58: ‘I
think what’s not predictable is that they would not see themselves as
having any different quality of life than normal boys. I think it’s quite
predictable that they would say that they’re glad they’re alive’.
However, in all these cases, the impact on parents could be considerable.
On this point, Doctor 32 added in relation to Tay–Sachs that the con-
dition would be serious ‘for the child, for the parents, just as bad. So
that I would consider serious on those two accounts’.59
Glover’s warning about making judgments that there is a risk that
someone will have a very low quality of life is salutary. In one of the dis-
cussion groups, Scientist 8 observed that one clinician had given a talk in
which he/she had said that the only condition in relation to which he/
she could ever recall that people said they would prefer not to be born
56 Ibid. 60.
57 ‘Lesch–Nyhan syndrome (LNS) is a rare, inherited disorder caused by a deficiency of the
enzyme hypoxanthine-guanine phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT). LNS is an X-linked
recessive disease – the gene is carried by the mother and passed on to her son. LNS is
present at birth in baby boys. The lack of HPRT causes a build-up of uric acid in all
body fluids, and leads to symptoms such as severe gout, poor muscle control, and mod-
erate retardation, which appear in the first year of life. A striking feature of LNS is self-
mutilating behaviors – characterized by lip and finger biting – that begin in the second
year of life. Abnormally high uric acid levels can cause sodium urate crystals to form in
the joints, kidneys, central nervous system, and other tissues of the body, leading to
gout-like swelling in the joints and severe kidney problems. Neurological symptoms
include facial grimacing, involuntary writhing, and repetitive movements of the arms
and legs similar to those seen in Huntington’s disease. Because a lack of HPRT
causes the body to poorly utilize vitamin B12, some boys may develop a rare disorder
called megaloblastic anemia. . .. The prognosis for individuals with LNS is poor.
Death is usually due to renal failure in the first or second decade of life’. National Insti-
tute of Neurological Disorders and Stoke, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/lesch_-
nyhan/lesch_nyhan.html.
58 EDG 2, Scientist 8, 48.
59 EDG 3, Doctor 32, 19.
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was epidermolysis bullosa (EB).60 This suggests that EB would be a
strong contender for being at the top of the list of very serious con-
ditions, although we have noted that it may be very hard to obtain
the views of a child with Tay–Sachs, who will be subject to rapid phys-
ical and mental deterioration and will die very young.
2.2 Less serious conditions
We now move away from conditions that some people might reasonably
regard as very serious (even though a person with a given very serious
condition may not say that his or her life is not worth living). Conditions
that might be seen as less serious include Cystic Fibrosis and Down syn-
drome, amongst others. What do PGD health professionals and scien-
tists think about testing for these conditions?
2.2.1 Cystic Fibrosis. A number of members of staff discussed Cystic
Fibrosis. Since someone with this (or any genetic) condition could only
ever exist with Cystic Fibrosis, we need to think about how severe the
condition is and whether it should be avoided for the ‘person’s sake’,
as it were. What did members of staff think about Cystic Fibrosis?
Scientist 21 observes: ‘I would say our role was to enable somebody to
have a healthy baby when, in the first instance they’ve got a fairly sub-
stantial risk of having an unhealthy baby. And so I guess. . . the dividing
line then is, what you classify as healthy and unhealthy and how
severe. . .’.61 He/she later refers to Cystic Fibrosis as ‘major’. Scientist
19 describes Cystic Fibrosis as ‘quite serious’.62 Doctor 24 thinks it is
‘fairly serious’.63 ‘Major’, ‘quite serious’ and ‘fairly serious’ all seem
to indicate a degree of uncertainty about the severity of Cystic Fibrosis.
The issue was touched on in one of the discussion groups. The philoso-
pher observed64:
BF: [O]ne of the groups that might. . . have serious questions to ask
of the work you do, are people who are born with and living with
disability, because what they might say is, ‘Actually we live
60 EDG 2, Scientist 8, 4. ‘Epidermolysis bullosa (EB) is the name given to a group of genetic
disorders that lead to fragile skin.This fragility leads toblistering and shearingof the skinas
a response to frictionandeverydayknocksandbumps. . ..There are threemajor typesofEB,
but the general symptoms in all forms of EB are skin fragility and blistering. In some types
the internal linings of the body canbeaffected, aswell as the corneaof the eye.Healingwith
scarring seen in some forms of EB can also lead to worsening disability. Within each type
there are sub-groups with a huge variety of symptoms and prognosis’. N.H.S. Direct
Health Encyclopaedia, ‘Epidermolysis bullosa’, http://www.nhsdirect.nhs.uk/articles/
article.aspx?articleId ¼ 560&PrintPage ¼ 1.
61 Interview, Scientist 21, 13.
62 Interview, Scientist 19, 4.
63 Interview, Doctor 24, 5.
64 B. Farsides, EDG 4, 32.
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perfectly good lives, we enjoy a good quality of life. Yet if you
match up the lives we’re living against the lives you’re selecting
out, they don’t look much different. . .’
In response, Doctor 11 observed: ‘You could use that argument quite
easily for Cystic Fibrosis, couldn’t you?’ This suggests we need to
reflect again on whose interests are being protected, or most protected,
in PGD, this time in relation to Cystic Fibrosis testing. In this regard,
Doctor 20 recalls an interesting couple65:
I saw a couple last week who came for Cystic Fibrosis, a fertile,
intelligent couple, who have a Cystic Fibrosis child. And I said,
‘What are you doing this for? Why don’t you just have another
pregnancy?’ And they couldn’t consider terminating a Cystic
child because, firstly they said, ‘we do not want to have another
child that we have to watch die or be very ill. But on the other
hand, if we kind of [terminate the] pregnancy it’s like terminating
[our existing child]. . . And we feel we can’t do that. And we want
some other way of approaching this.’
In this case, the testing seems very much in the interests of the parents:
although PGD is not 100% accurate, these parents clearly saw the possi-
bility of a pregnancy achieved through PGD as a way of avoiding the
potentially very painful issues they might face if a foetus tested positive
for Cystic Fibrosis. The question of trying to avoid the dilemmas around
termination is extremely important in PGD and is often referred to by
members of staff both in interviews and in the discussion groups.66
The issue may be particularly acute because, as with the parents in
Doctor 20’s example, the parents have already had another child with
the relevant condition; or they may have terminated one or more preg-
nancies; or they may have miscarried earlier pregnancies and want to
avoid the risk of miscarriage inherent in diagnostic testing in pregnancy.
Overall, then, it may be defensible to describe Cystic Fibrosis (which
can vary in its severity) as ‘serious’, provided that we recognise that it
does not seem to be so serious as to give rise to a risk of a life of very
low quality, one that may not be worth living. Further, since someone
with Cystic Fibrosis could only ever exist as that person, the seriousness
of the condition may really relate more to their parents’ interests. Recall
again the comment of Scientist 21 (in relation to another condition)
that: ‘So that implies we’re doing this for the parents and not for the
child in some respects’. What we have seen so far is that although this
could be true in relation to what might be seen as very serious
65 Interview, Doctor 20, 20.
66 E.g. EDG 5, Scientist 2; and in interview Scientist 8, 5, 17.
340 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2007]
conditions (such as Tay–Sachs), it is particularly the case in relation to
less serious ones. We discuss the moral acceptability of PGD that may
ultimately be predominantly in the parents’ interests below when we
turn to consider Down syndrome.
When prospective parents discuss the seriousness of a given condition
with members of staff, they need to know about what that condition
involves. The question of information provision is in fact part of
Recommendation 14 in the Outcome Document, the recommendation
(to recap) that states ‘that the seriousness of a condition should be a
matter for discussion between the people seeking treatment and the
clinical team’. The recommendation in fact goes on to state67:
[I]nformation provided to those seeking treatment. . . should
include genetic and clinical information about the specific
condition; its likely impact on those affected and their families;
information about treatment and social support available; and
the testimony of families and individuals about the full range of
experiences of living with the condition.
In turn, this is embodied in the HFEA’s latest Code of Practice.68
Now, an important aspect of PGD for a condition such as Cystic
Fibrosis is that the people who seek PGD for this condition will have
a reason to think that they are at risk. This may be because they have
had a child with Cystic Fibrosis, or someone in their wider family may
have the condition or one of the couple has the condition. (In contrast,
in dominant conditions—such as Huntington’s chorea, achondroplasia
and myotonic dystrophy—one of the parents is always affected (or will
be in due course if it is late-onset) and will therefore have a particularly
personal view of the situation.) Indeed, it will likely be for one of these
reasons that they come to the clinic seeking PGD. The couple will there-
fore have some knowledge about what living with Cystic Fibrosis is like.
This, in turn, would mean ( for instance, if PGD for Cystic Fibrosis had
not yet been licensed and, therefore, a decision had to be made about
whether to offer such testing) that their views as to its seriousness
would carry some considerable weight. Generally, it may mean that
these couples are likely to have less need for information about the
condition than other people may have. In contrast, if a couple presented
for consultation having had a child who was very mildly affected by
Cystic Fibrosis, they may well need to know more about the condition.
The general point here is that people seeking PGD for Cystic Fibrosis
67 Supra n. 1, para. 32 and Rec. 13. Para. 34 addresses the issue of information provision,
especially the need for balanced information, which includes ‘that provided by disabled
people and their families’, an issue to which we return later.
68 Supra n. 3.
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will typically have a good idea of what it involves, even if they may benefit
from further information about (say) the spectrum of severity; this may
help them gauge the severity of what they have ‘experienced’ so far.
An additional point to note here is that when people approach a clinic
about the possibility of PGD for something they have experienced in
some way, they must think that it is important enough to try to ‘do
something about it’. As one member of staff put this, ‘of course it
must be serious for them to come here’.69 This does not tell us ‘for
whom’ the condition is serious, but it does tell us that people have
experienced something as a problem and have decided to go out of
their way to try to avoid it. In relation to experience of a condition
and subsequent knowledge of it, the situation may be very different in
relation to the second condition we now discuss, Down syndrome.
2.2.2 Down syndrome. At the time of the interviews and discussion
groups, one of the issues the clinic was considering was whether to
offer PGD for Down syndrome to patients coming through for PGD
for other conditions. New developments in PGD technology are
behind this move, which would mean that identification for trisomy
21 could be ‘added in’ to other PGD testing. We now explore some of
the issues at stake in this idea, as revealed through the interviews and
discussion groups.
To offer women testing for Down syndrome under these circum-
stances would be to offer them testing for a condition which was not
the primary focus of their PGD attempt. It would typically mean that
staff took the initiative of offering this test in the course of discussions
with a couple. For older women, the issue of Down syndrome may
well be in their minds before any overt offer of a test. For many
younger women, the issue may not be so prominent although it is
likely that, if they were to become pregnant, they would face the issue
later given the current national screening programme for Down syn-
drome. At the PGD stage, however, since the offer of testing for
Down syndrome would be in addition to testing for another condition,
and since the primary focus of couples in coming to the clinic would
have been on that other condition, testing for Down syndrome would
be different in various ways from testing for conditions such as Duch-
enne muscular dystrophy or Cystic Fibrosis. We would like to explore
some of these differences with reference to staff’s views about Down
syndrome and PGD for this condition.
A preliminary point to make is that the accuracy of testing for Down
syndrome is an important issue. This is noted by Scientist 21, who
seemed to be in favour of PGD for Down syndrome, subject to concerns
69 Interview, Doctor 6, 13.
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about accuracy in the test itself and the possibility of then having to
exclude what were in fact normal embryos.70 We cannot discuss the
scientific aspects here. Our discussion can only proceed on the basis
that testing for Down syndrome is, or could become, sufficiently accu-
rate to justify its inclusion at the PGD stage. To some degree, this is a
matter of judgment that needs to be related to the significance of the
risk and the perceived seriousness of the condition. As we have seen,
these are not purely objective matters.
What are some of the attitudes of staff to Down syndrome? In one
of the discussion groups, Embryologist 33 says that ‘people [with
Down syndrome] can still have fully functional lives. . .’.71 Scientist 2
later observes: ‘. . .and they feel they have a fulfilling life, and that’s
what counts, how they feel. If they feel it’s fulfilling, it doesn’t matter
what anyone else says, if they feel they have had a worthwhile life
and what they’ve achieved. . .’.72 In another discussion group, Scientist
8 observes73: ‘You mentioned earlier about Down’s, which used to be
the end of the world, and now it’s a much more accepted condition.
And as time moves on and people’s ideas change, you can’t have hard
and fast rules’. None of these comments suggests that these members
of staff thought that Down syndrome should be avoided for the sake
of the person with the condition. Those groups that did touch upon
the issue of Down syndrome then had to face the question of why
there might be screening for this condition.
To begin, there was some discussion of screening for Down syndrome
in the PND context. For instance, in response to Scientist 8’s comment
above about ideas changing, Counsellor 28 observes74: ‘Right, but it’s
still the most common condition for which we’ve screened’. In
another group, Doctor 24 observes ‘[t]here’s such a lot going on
about Down’s syndrome. There’s so much work going on, there’s so
much apprehension going on. . .’.75 Who is this work for? Although
the severity of Down syndrome varies considerably, the idea that it is
better not to be born than to have Down syndrome is highly implausible.
We must face the recognition then, that Down syndrome screening is
really aimed at prospective parents. Is this morally acceptable? To
offer any thoughts on this, we need to think both about prospective
parents and about the embryo or foetus.
70 Interview, Scientist 21, 23–24.
71 EDG 5, Embryologist 33, 33–34.
72 Ibid. Scientist 2.
73 EDG 2, Scientist 8, 14–15.
74 EDG 2, Counsellor 28, 14–15, part cited above.
75 EDG 1, Doctor 24, 13.
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Turning to the parents, it could be argued that they should have some
choice in reproduction about whether to have a child with a disability,
including one that is not so serious as to lead to a very low quality of life
for a child, such as Cystic Fibrosis or Down syndrome. The idea that
reproductive autonomy should include, to some extent, the ability to
avoid congenital disability in future children is supported by a
number of different writers, some from a broadly liberal perspective.76
Perhaps most strikingly, there is some support for this idea from the dis-
ability critique of prenatal screening and selective abortion.77 For
instance, Shakespeare observes generally78:
[T]here are reasons to want to prevent the birth of a child affected
by impairment which do not reflect discrimination against disabled
people: for example, the desire to avoid the early death or suffering
of a loved child, or a feeling that a family will be unable to cope
with the strain of looking after a very impaired member.
(He also emphasises the need ‘for better provision of welfare services
and financial benefits to parents of disabled children, in order to make
it easier for parents to choose to. . . continue such a pregnancy’.79)
Turning now to the embryo or foetus, the acceptability of selection
will depend, in part, on the question of the moral status of each. The
argument that parents are entitled to have some choice about whether
to have a child with a disability entails the view that the moral status
of the embryo (at the time of PGD) or the foetus ( for instance, at the
time of a nuchal fold scan for Down syndrome and chorionic villus
sampling) is not so great as to outweigh the prospective parents’
reproductive autonomy interest in avoiding disability in a future child.
In contrast, if we were to give greater moral importance to the
embryo or foetus or both, we might say that it is only morally acceptable
to test (with possible discard or termination) where there is a serious
risk that a child would have a life of very low quality. (For some, of
course, even this would not be acceptable.) As we have seen, however,
several members of staff at this PGD clinic seem to think that it is
76 E.g. A. Buchanan et al., supra n. 37; J. Robertson, ‘Genetic Selection of Offspring
Characteristics’, (1996) 76 Boston University Law Review 421; B. Steinbock, ‘Disabil-
ity, Prenatal Testing and Selective Abortion’, in E. Parens and A. Asch (eds), Prenatal
Testing and Disability Rights (Georgetown University Press, 2000) 108; J. Botkin,
‘Line Drawing: Developing Professional Standards for Prenatal Diagnostic Services’,
in E. Parens and A. Asch, ibid. 288.
77 See e.g. T. Shakespeare, ‘Choices and Rights: Eugenics, Genetics and Disability Equal-
ity’, (1998) 13/5 Disability and Society 665, 672.
78 T. Shakespeare, ‘‘Losing the Plot?’ Medical and Activist Discourses of Contemporary
Genetics and Disability’, (1999) 21/5 Sociology of Health and Illness 669, 681.
79 T. Shakespeare, supra n. 77, 672.
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appropriate to take account of parental interests in PGD and were pre-
pared to say so quite explicitly in relation to very serious conditions as
well as in relation to Cystic Fibrosis. This suggests that they consider
that in such cases the parental interests outweigh the moral claims of
the embryo.
More specifically, why might parents be interested in the option of
avoiding the birth of a child with Down syndrome and how might
this compare with their interests in relation to Cystic Fibrosis? In the
latter case, it may be that prospective parents are likely to think primar-
ily about the avoidance of suffering. Arguably, they can think of Cystic
Fibrosis testing as ‘testing which avoids suffering’. This is so even though
to be born with this condition often appears compatible with a reason-
able quality of life and a life worth living. In the case of Down syn-
drome, there may be physical suffering in severe cases and prospective
parents may worry, in particular, about the risk of cardiac defects, par-
ticularly inoperable ones. However, it may be that prospective parents
are more likely to think about the question of mental impairment and
to worry about how severe this may be. Although mental impairment
may give rise to a loss of opportunity in the life of someone with
Down syndrome, it will not necessarily mean that that person is
unhappy or feels unfulfilled themselves, although they may suffer from
social stigma. Despite this, in light of the potential health problems
and a degree of mental impairment, it seems unlikely that prospective
parents would hope for a child with Down syndrome. At the same
time, it may be hard for prospective parents to face—let alone admit
to—the possibility that Down syndrome testing may really be about
their own potential interests and concerns. Interestingly, this difficulty
appears to be echoed among the staff at the clinic (many of whom are
likely to be parents) in their discussions of Down syndrome, since it
seemed hard for anyone to state explicitly that testing for Down syn-
drome might really concern parental interests although Scientist 8
(below) touches on this. Further, out of the 26 interviews conducted
at this site, only 4 brought up the example of Down syndrome in their
one-to-one interviews, although the interviewer occasionally raised
it.80 (Of course, in part, this is not surprising in that PGD for Down
80 Scientist 9 raises the issue of PGD for Down syndrome in addition to testing for other
conditions. Scientist 3 mentions Down syndrome, but this is simply in connection
with analysing amniocentesis results. Administrator 12 comments on whether people
necessarily abort a foetus with Down syndrome. Counsellor 17 raises the issue of
adding in PGD for Down syndrome in relation to concerns about decreasing the accu-
racy of test results. Scientist 21 discusses Down syndrome and PGD for Down syn-
drome, although the interviewer was the first to mention the issue. Doctor 6
responded to a question about Down syndrome by the interviewer; Doctor 24
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syndrome had only just become part of the agenda for discussion at the
clinic.) Rather, typically the issue was brought up by the philosopher in
the discussion groups.
The important point about whose interests may be at stake (and why)
in testing for Down syndrome was put to one of the groups by the
philosopher81:
[I]n the past people were very ready to make quite sort of broad
sweeping statements about the quality of life of somebody with
Down’s syndrome. But people now no longer feel happy making
[those statements]. The shift of emphasis is on, ‘Well what does it
mean to the family to have a child that will remain dependent for
much longer in their life, that might have. . . health problems etc?
What does it mean to the other siblings?’ And some people are
less comfortable with that sort of more global calculation than
they would be with the calculation in the case where you actually
look at the condition and. . .
Here, she suggests some plausible reasons as to why parents may be con-
cerned to be able to choose whether or not to have a child with Down
syndrome and, at the same time, acknowledges that recognition of
these reasons may be uncomfortable or unacceptable for some. Of
course, if we do accept that parents are entitled to avoid the birth of chil-
dren even when they would have conditions, such as Cystic Fibrosis, that
might well enable them to have a reasonable quality of life, then we
have no reason to say that it is not acceptable for parents to be con-
cerned with the similarly less serious (though very different) condition
of Down syndrome. However, it could be argued that it may be
harder to acknowledge this openly in the case of Down syndrome
because of the element of mental impairment: in particular, we specu-
late that it may be easier for parents to say that they want to avoid suf-
fering ( for instance, as in the case of Cystic Fibrosis) than to say that
they want to avoid mental impairment in their child (in the case of
Down syndrome). What did staff think about the philosopher’s sugges-
tion about what may be the real purpose of Down syndrome testing?
At this point, Doctor 22 commented that ‘those children are very
happy children often aren’t they?’. Scientist 8 responded82:
But that’s exactly the point. In that situation we’re talking about
existing individuals and their quality of life. When we’re looking
responded to two such questions; Nurse 25 responds to a question about Down syn-
drome in connection with PGD.
81 B. Farsides, EDG 2, 5.
82 EDG 2, Scientist 8, 5.
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at a PGD family, we’re not saying, we’re not making any judgement
about an existing individual by saying that on average these people
do not have the opportunities and quality of life that normal people
have, the parents have a huge burden. So we’re not, there’s no living
person that we’re saying we’re going to take away their life, this is
not about that. We’re not going to deprive some individual, of life,
by doing the test. I mean it is different – a non-existing person does
not have the same weight in the balance as the existing person. Isn’t
that right?
Scientist 8 seems to envisage here the idea of PGD for Down syndrome,
although he/she may also be alluding to PGD more generally. There are
a number of important ideas embedded in what he/she says and it is
worth trying to spell these out: first, that when people reflect that chil-
dren with Down syndrome often seem ‘very happy’, they are thinking of
people who actually exist and their quality of life; and, therefore, sec-
ondly, deliberations in PGD do not entail judgments about the quality
of lives of existing people; rather, thirdly, they entail general reflection
on the opportunities and quality of life ‘on average’; fourthly, there is
the suggestion (which may or may not include Down syndrome) that
parents ‘have a huge burden’; fifthly, the point is made that no-one’s
life is being taken away by doing ‘the test’, coupled with the thought
that ‘non-existing’ people have less weight in any moral equation than
existing ones. Arguably, if we were to take the view that the foetus
has greater moral status than the embryo (and various members of
staff seemed to think this was the case, while others did not),83 this
last statement would apply more strongly in the PGD than the PND
context. However, since on many moral views also the 12-week
foetus is not a person,84 the statement may also apply in the context
of PND. Each of these statements seems concerned to justify the idea
of PGD, including PGD for Down syndrome, and among them we
find the notion of a ‘burden’ for parents. Interestingly, we find the state-
ment about parents’ interests mixed in with a number of important
statements about the justifiability of testing. This may again highlight
the difficulty that people may seem to feel about pointing too overtly
to parents’ potential interests in relation to Down syndrome testing.
83 Examples of staff in favour of a gradualist approach to the embryo’s and foetus’s moral
status were Scientist 8, 4, and Embryologist 15, 16; an example of a member of staff
who attributed a high moral status to the embryo was Scientist 2, 15–16. We do not
attempt here to represent the proportion of staff with given views.
84 In contrast, even the embryo has the moral status of a born child on a potentiality
account. For an adherent, see J. Finnis, ‘The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A
Reply to Judith Thomson’, (1973) 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 117.
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Since Down syndrome is a condition about which people may be
fearful, they may also be misinformed. In particular, people may
overestimate the impact on them of the birth of a child with Down
syndrome. Being well or fully informed about the life of someone
with Down syndrome will most likely not be true of the majority of
the couples coming through for PGD for another condition. One
reason for this is that the syndrome arises from a chromosomal
trisomy and is generally not inherited. Even if a couple has met or
known a child or an adult with Down syndrome, they will not necess-
arily know about the range of severity of effects, both physical and
mental. Information provision in relation to a condition such as
Down syndrome would therefore be very important if PGD for Down
syndrome were offered at the clinic. Shakespeare has suggested that
Decisions about screening should be based on good information:
rather than evaluating screening programmes in terms of those
who undergo tests and terminations, programmes should be evalu-
ated in terms of the proportion of people who were empowered to
make an informed choice.85
The possibly unbalanced nature of information about Down syndrome
has been explored in the context of PND.86 It would, therefore, be
crucial that this issue is adequately addressed in the context of PGD.
In one of the groups, staff showed an awareness of the importance of
information provision. With reference to Down syndrome being the
most common condition for which there is prenatal screening, Scientist
8 observed87: ‘But that’s presumably because the women who accept the
screening and prenatal testing, are ones who know about the condition
enough to know that they will not necessarily want to have a Down’s
baby’. However, Counsellor 28 responded: ‘Except I think they
don’t. . .’. The concern that people may take up the offer of Down syn-
drome screening and testing without adequate reflection (either in the
PND or PGD context) is well caught by Counsellor 1088: ‘As long as
the medical profession is vigilant in providing unbiased, accurate infor-
mation, and not just putting these couples or women on a conveyor belt,
you know, like what sort of has happened with the Down’s syndrome
screening, then I think you’re empowering people to make an individual
choice’.
85 T. Shakespeare, Supra n. 78, 685.
86 See C. Williams, P. Alderson and B. Farsides, ‘What Constitutes ‘Balanced Information
in the Practitioners’ Portrayals of Down’s Syndrome?’, (2002) 18 Midwifery 230.
87 EDG 2, Scientist 8, 14–15.
88 EDG 1, Counsellor 10, 29.
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We have suggested why parents may want to be informed about
Down syndrome and why they may or may not want to accept the
offer of testing for it. We have also suggested that there are arguments
as to why testing for Down syndrome may legitimately be seen as part
of reproductive autonomy (at least at the stage of selection by PGD
and earlier rather than later in a pregnancy) just as testing for other
conditions that leave someone with a life they think worth living,
such as Cystic Fibrosis, may be.
We now turn very briefly to note the remaining factors that the HFEA
recommends should be considered in relation to the decision to under-
take particular PGD tests and to draw out some relevant comments of
the clinic’s staff. There is only scope to give a flavour of the views
of health professionals and scientists in relation to these factors.
3. The Extent of Any Intellectual Impairment
The possible distinction between a child’s and its parents’ interests can
also be noted in relation to ‘the extent of any intellectual impairment’.
A child with moderate intellectual impairment may well make consider-
able educational progress and subsequently lead a life of some indepen-
dence.89 This may be the case with more mild expressions of Down
syndrome. Yet, if the people seeking treatment have some interest in
which children are born, then their views and interests will have some
weight. Apparently in support of this, Administrator 12 observed:
‘I don’t say that a child with learning difficulties or anything like that
isn’t going to be able to live a good life, good quality of life. But I
think the couples should be able to make that decision themselves’.
4. The Extent of Social Support Available
Clearly, good social support will be in the interests of both a child and
its parents. The issue was touched on in one of the discussion groups, as
Doctor 32 observed: ‘But if you talk about it basically, you know, why
can’t a child with a disability, with Down syndrome or something else,
not be perfectly okay if it’s adequately supported?’90 We can relate this
observation to the distinction between ‘medical’ and ‘social’ models of
disability. The medical model has tended to dominate understandings
of what it is to be disabled.91 We may have seen an example of this
above when Scientist 2 observed: ‘No, but, when it’s serious, their life
is completely debilitated by it. . . it’s medically serious’.92 The medical
89 On Down syndrome, see the Down’s Syndrome Association, at http://www.downs-
syndrome.org.uk.
90 EDG 3, Doctor 32, 26.
91 See e.g. J. Harris, ‘Is There a Coherent Social Conception of Disability?’, (2000) 26
J.M.E. 95.
92 Our emphasis.
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model has been subject to a critique in the form of the ‘social’ model.93
The former locates disability within the individual, the latter in the
social environment the individual inhabits, so that the individual is
‘impaired’, not ‘disabled’. Over time, some proponents of either
model have accepted to some degree the limitations of their respective
approaches.94 And it is now clear that some combination of the
models is best placed to account for the significance of impairment.95
In turn, it can reasonably be acknowledged, as Shakespeare has, that
despite good social support there may still be considerable difficulties
in raising an ‘affected’ child.96 Therefore, if prospective parents’ inter-
ests are relevant to selection decisions, there may still be reason to test
for a given condition, even when good social support would be available
(which it will not always be).
5. The Family Circumstances of the People Seeking Treatment
There are various elements of possible relevance here. Prospective
parents may already have other affected children. Or this factor might
allow for concerns as to the possible effects, one way or the other, of
the birth of a seriously impaired child in a family generally. The
welfare-of the-child requirement of the Human Fertilisation and Embry-
ology Act allows for the interests of other children to be considered.97
Whether ‘family circumstances’ is confined to the nuclear family or
whether a couple must already have children in order for this factor
to be relevant is unclear. Arguably, some flexibility here is desirable
given the variation in families’ experiences. The relevance of family cir-
cumstances to all the conditions discussed here was noted implicitly or
explicitly in earlier discussion, for instance, in relation to Duchenne
muscular dystrophy, Cystic Fibrosis and Down syndrome. Further,
there were numerous observations in the discussion groups and inter-
views that revealed great empathy with couples in light of their family
experience to date. For instance, in relation to cancer in the family,
Nurse 4 observes98:
So if someone felt so passionate about it, I don’t feel that I can judge
or say what they - because I don’t know, unless you’re in someone
else’s shoes, I don’t feel that we can make such a judgment really.
93 See e.g. T. Shakespeare, supra n. 77.
94 E.g. J. Harris and T. Shakespeare, supra n. 91 and 77.
95 J. Glover, supra n. 53, pp. 7–8.
96 See e.g. T. Shakespeare, supra n. 77.
97 The HFE Act, s.13(5) states: ‘A woman shall not be provided with treatment services
unless account has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be born as a
result of the treatment (including the need of that child for a father), and of any
other child who may be affected by the birth’.
98 Interview, Nurse 4, 8.
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So if someone has got a family history, a very strong family history
of cancer, then . . . who am I to say?
Doctor 6 also alludes generally to the experience with which a couple
presents at the clinic99:
There are very few grey areas that I find in my mind. I think that
anybody. . . that comes here seeking PGD has been on such a
roller coaster ride and been through so much, that one has to
appreciate just the sheer emotional turmoil they’ve been through.
Doctor 6 also notes the difficulty of making judgments about serious-
ness unless one has experience of a condition:
. . .I think you can only make decisions on such subjects if you have
experience in that. I don’t. I couldn’t tell you whether. . . was
serious enough, but I bet if we had a roomful of parents and
families with children affected with it, I’m sure they would voice
their opinion - in their situation it is a hugely important, devastat-
ing thing.
Further, Counsellor 17 observes that ‘at the end of the day, it should
be – we should be led by what parents want to do, they’re in the best
position to know what’s right for them and their family’.100
6. The Availability of Effective Therapy or Management Now and
in the Future
The availability of therapy or management now is potentially relevant to
many conditions. The possibility of future treatment is of particular
significance in relation to testing for late onset or lower penetrance
disorders, especially certain breast cancers. (It is beyond our scope to
consider the HFEA’s recent consultation and decision in relation to
these.101) For instance, in one of the discussion groups Scientist 34
observed102: ‘[W]ith breast cancer you can have all this, you know, pre-
ventative treatment and treatment is a lot better’. Later, the discussion
proceeded as follows:
Scientist 2: But it’s treatable to the point where you will have a
normal lifespan. . .
Embryologist 33: Not in everybody.
99 Interview, Doctor 6, 4.
100 Interview, Counsellor 17, 18–19.
101 See HFEA, Choices and Boundaries (Nov. 2005); HFEA, ‘Authority Decision on the
Use of PGD for Lower Penetrance, Later Onset Inherited Conditions’ (10 May 2006).
102 EDG 5, Scientist 34, 25.
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Scientist 2: No, but it can be now because you can have a mastect-
omy and that’s it, you’re cured for life.
There is not scope here to discuss other aspects of treatment by mastect-
omy and the suitability of PGD for breast cancer. It would be interesting
to know whether there would ever be a situation in which the clinical
staff thought that the relevant treatment was sufficient, but prospective
parents did not. Given the empathy with a couple’s family experience
that we saw in relation to the previous factor, it is possible that most
members of staff would defer to patients on the question of the accept-
ability of a given treatment. Inevitably, however, there remains the issue
of uncertainty as to future treatments.
7. The Speed of Degeneration in Progressive Disorders
Once again, both the child’s and the prospective parents’ interests could
be relevant. In the extreme case of Tay–Sachs, where a child will live at
most four to five years and will suffer greatly during this time, birth is
unlikely to be either in its or its parents’ interests and so PGD for
Tay–Sachs is arguably strongly supportable. The clinic’s staff were
highly sensitive to the impact of a child’s death on its parents. For
instance, from one of the discussion groups103:
Doctor 32: For the parents, the death of a child is very serious. . . I
can only, of course, judge from the outside experience, you know,
because I’ve been an oncologist for a long time. And I’ve seen chil-
dren die and what that did to the parents throughout the illness and
the death and everything. So that’s where I’m coming from. . .
It is beyond our scope to discuss the quality of life of someone who dies,
say, in the teenage or early to mid-adult years. However, when someone
has lived that much longer, perhaps into early to mid-adulthood, then it
may be that prospective parents’ interests may have less weight in selec-
tion decisions, although this will be complicated by the severity and
certainty of the relevant condition. Testing for Huntington’s Chorea is
taking place and, generally, the staff were very open to the views of
people who had experience, in one way or another, of Huntington’s.
For instance, in interview Nurse 4 observed: ‘when you’ve got
something like Huntington’s. . . I mean the parents are so aware of
how devastating it is’.104
8. Their Previous Reproductive Experience
Lastly, great sensitivity to a couple’s reproductive past was shown in
very many of the interviews and discussion groups. There was discussion
103 EDG 3, Doctor 32, 19, partly noted earlier.
104 Interview, Nurse 4, 7–8.
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of the experience of couples with another affected child (or children), of
couples who had frequently miscarried and of couples who had felt the
need to terminate previous pregnancies.
In relation to the advantages of PGD over PND, Scientist 8 observes:
‘I would look at it very much from the woman’s point of view, that it’s
rescuing women from having to make those appalling decisions’.105
Similarly, Embryologist 15 observes106:
I think I’ve got a leaning towards PGD more from a patient-
orientated view, inasmuch as what the patients have actually
been through to actually be at that stage, and offering a treatment
that doesn’t involve termination of a fetus when it’s actually
growing inside them, I think it’s a really viable way of bypassing
a lot of problems with terminations of pregnancy for what are
often the most atrocious diseases, you know, really they’ve been
through a lot of trauma by the time they actually come to see us.
The avoidance of further difficulties or suffering was also relevant in
relation to patients who had suffered from miscarriages due to chromo-
somal translocations. Doctor 14 observes107:
And, to me, it is legitimate to avoid them going through this
heartbreaking experience and the anticipation and the torture of
not knowing a) that it will happen, b) that if it happens and they
became pregnant and that pregnancy would be doomed to
another miscarriage – so, in my mind, that is a sensible indication
to give them the benefit of treatment and the technique that will
increase the probability of them having a continuous pregnancy
as opposed to going through that experience again.
Here, there is the highly compassionate suggestion that a couple should
not be expected to suffer just because the risk of miscarriage in relation
to a given translocation is not certain.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
At the start of this paper, we reviewed the HFEA and HGC recommen-
dations and discussions relating to the PGD criteria of ‘a significant risk
of a serious genetic condition’. We saw that the recommendations
sought to recognise, at least to some extent, the personal nature of the
issues at stake in PGD, but also to observe limits to the legitimacy of
prospective parents’ views. In summary, this was to be achieved by
105 Interview, Scientist 8, 2.
106 Interview, Embryologist 15, 2.
107 Interview, Doctor 14, 8.
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requiring discussion between prospective parents and health pro-
fessionals about the degree of risk and the seriousness of any given
condition. We suggested that the HFEA and HGC had, in effect, put
these professionals in the position of being something of a ‘check’ on
what these bodies saw as the potentially excessively wide views of
those seeking treatment.108 Have the views of staff that we have
explored here indeed shown these health professionals and scientists
to be in this gatekeeper role?
In relation to the degree of risk, we saw that health professionals and
scientists tended to view risk in quantitative terms. (Of course, the
Abortion Act relies on a quantitative notion of ‘substantial risk’.) This
was interesting, given that a possibly more subjective notion of risk
was intended by the JWP.109 One exception to this is Scientist 21,
who commented on how his/her own experience of pregnancy
changed his/her perception of risk110:
So, what I’m saying, actually putting myself in that position of the
patient, it completely changed my perspective. . . subsequently,
when I’ve been giving risk figures out to people, because I can
imagine what it’s like getting that figure, that result myself now.
As we have seen, the HFEA and HGC also envisaged that the degree of
risk should be a matter for discussion and agreement.
Most of our discussion concentrated on the thorny issue of seriousness.
We saw that health professionals and scientists saw some conditions as
being very definitely serious, such as Tay–Sachs, but that many saw
less serious conditions, such as Cystic Fibrosis (and potentially Down syn-
drome) as sufficiently serious to meet the criteria for PGD.111 Given that
these conditions were less serious, however, the question then arose
‘serious for whom?’. Here we saw the view, at least on the part of
some staff, that sometimes seriousness concerns possible parental inter-
ests. In relation to Down syndrome, this tended to be implied rather
than stated. In line with the recognition generally of the legitimacy of par-
ental interests, great weight was given to the views of prospective parents
by staff. They were mindful of couples’ previous reproductive experi-
ence—particularly the traumas of abortion and miscarriage—and also
of the experience that those seeking treatment might have of a given
108 HFEA licence committees are of course a further possible check. However, it is likely
that if a clinic supports an application for PGD, the licence committee will usually
agree.
109 ibid and Supra n. 10.
110 Interview, Scientist 21, 27.
111 The possibility of testing for Down syndrome, as an addition, was the subject of discus-
sion at the clinic.
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condition, for instance through the previous birth of an affected child. In
this process staff were, in effect, attending to many of the factors that the
HFEA and HGC recommended should be considered in the decision to
offer PGD.
However, although staff were sensitive to prospective parents’ views
and experiences, this did not mean that they necessarily thought that
‘anything goes’. While they were often prepared to defer to prospective
patients in relation to ‘grey areas’, this was largely because they thought
it would be inappropriate to judge the seriousness of a condition of
which they had no experience. Further, by definition of course, a ‘grey
area’ is not one that concerns trivial features or conditions. Indeed,
there was a recognition that people would only be motivated to seek
PGD and, in particular, go through with the attendant IVF, where
they truly experienced something as a problem—as ‘serious’. In these
cases, it is likely (though not certain) that staff (and perhaps HFEA
licence committees when the case is made out by staff ) will agree that
a condition is sufficiently serious to justify PGD. This is not to deny
that there may always be conditions that may provoke debate and
disagreement, perhaps between staff and perhaps also, though not
necessarily, between staff and prospective parents. The clinic’s regular
case-by-case and multi-disciplinary meetings (to discuss new con-
ditions) were noted above.
In summary, it appears that if these health professionals and scientists
were truly to doubt the seriousness of a given condition for which a
couple is seeking PGD, they would act as a check on their views, and
would be likely to deny the provision of PGD. In any event, in response
to the idea that relatively mild conditions might be the subject of testing,
Scientist 8 reminds us of the ‘limitations of PGD in terms of the number
of embryos you have available’.112 The implication of this limitation is
that at some point a couple’s desire to have a child at all could come into
conflict with their desire to have a child without a very much less serious
condition. In other words, they would have to reflect carefully on their
true goal.
Overall, these health professionals and scientists showed great
empathy with the experiences of prospective parents and were likely
to defer to their views. In response to the interviewer’s question,
‘[s]hould we always give patients what they want?’, Doctor 14 replies:
‘No, no. It’s not in absolute terms. They want it for a legitimate
reason’.113 Of another staff member, the interviewer asks: ‘[i]f they
wanted to do something, anything, would it be acceptable because it
112 EDG 2, Scientist 8, 19.
113 Interview, Doctor 14, 2. The interviewer was K. Ehrich.
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is what they wish?’ Scientist 9 responds114: ‘I think it depends on, it’s
within reason, isn’t it?’ This notion of reason is crucial. The scientist
continues: ‘But what is reason, whose reason, whose reason is it?’
More generally, this is a central question in medical ethics and law.
The best answer that we can give in this context is that as long as a
condition lies in that ‘grey area’, its seriousness can be a matter of
reasonable disagreement. For this reason, it could be appropriate to
offer PGD.
114 Interview, Scientist 9, 7. The interviewer was K. Ehrich.
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